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Abstract
We construct key household and individual economic variables using a panel
micro data set from the Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS) for
1994-2005. We analyze cross-sectional income and consumption inequality and
find that inequality decreased during the 2000-2005 economic recovery. The
decrease appears to be driven by falling volatility of transitory income shocks.
The response of consumption to permanent and transitory income shocks becomes
weaker later in the sample, consistent with greater self-insurance against
permanent shocks and greater smoothing of transitory shocks. Comparisons of
RLMS data with official macroeconomic statistics reveal that national accounts
may underestimate the extent of unofficial economic activity, and that the official
consumer price index may overstate inflation and be prone to quality bias.
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1. Introduction
Modern macroeconomists are increasingly relying on the analysis of environments with
heterogeneous agents. Many macroeconomic questions can only be asked (and answered) in the
context of multi-agent environments. These richer macroeconomic models require a
correspondingly rich set of empirical facts that come from micro data and incorporate
information on distributions in addition to the usual aggregates. The goal of this paper is to
provide a comprehensive set of cross-sectional and time series stylized facts for the Russian
economy and a systematic study of multiple dimensions of inequality.
Since the late 1980s, Russian economy has been subject to substantial macroeconomic
volatility, with a long phase of severe output contraction, periods of high and variable inflation,
and a subsequent period of recovery.

At the same time, Russia has tremendous regional

diversity. The combination of these factors presents unique opportunities for studying both
cross-sectional and time-varying dimensions of inequality. Fortunately, high quality data are
available to explore these opportunities: a large, nationally representative panel study of Russian
households that incorporates economic variables, the Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey
(RLMS).
This paper includes multiple dimensions of inequality, with particular focus on
consumption and income. We construct the key variables describing the economic behavior of
Russian households and individuals and analyze their cross-sectional dispersion and time series
patterns. Specifically, we create time-varying distributions of individual earnings and labor
supply, as well as household-level income, expenditure, and consumption.
We would like to highlight two main results. First, almost all measures of cross-sectional
inequality in income and consumption started falling during 2000-2005, after staying relatively
high during 1994-1998. Second, the measured fall in inequality is mostly due to the moderation
of the transitory shocks to household income and consumption.
The recent period of falling inequality was preceded by an initial rise in the early 1990s
that accompanied Russia’s transition from a centrally planned to market economy (e.g.,
Commander et al 1999, Galbraith et al 2004). However, the level of inequality at the end of our
2

sample is still higher than it was during the socialist era. Interestingly, poor households do not
appear to fall behind during the economic recovery – the lower tail of the expenditure
distribution does not diverge from the middle as the economy expands. The latest level of
inequality that we find is typical for a middle income country. For example, the Gini coefficient
in 2005 was about 0.38-0.40, which is just slightly above the mean value of Gini coefficients for
after-tax household income and consumption from upper middle income countries.1,2
Some features that set the Russian economy apart from more developed countries turn
out to be important for the analysis of inequality. One such feature is home production of food.
Our results indicate that home-grown food has a large equalizing effect on income and
consumption. The effect is large, because poorer rural households are also the ones that grow a
lot of food for own consumption.

Another unique feature of the Russian economy is its

geographic diversity. Accounting for regional differences in the cost of living (that vary by a
factor of 2.7 in Russia) is shown to have a sizeable equalizing effect. Other important features of
the Russian transition, such as underreporting of income, wage payment delays, irregularities in
government transfer payments, and forced in-kind substitutes in lieu of wage payments also
explain some of the inequality trends.
The comparison of income and expenditure inequality reveals further differences from
developed economies. In developed economies, expenditures are usually distributed more
equally than income, which is attributed to consumption smoothing possibilities. This turns out
not to be the case for Russia, where expenditure inequality is almost as high as income
inequality. We argue that the relatively high expenditure inequality reflected peculiar patterns of
consumption smoothing during the downturn. Households facing irregular wage and transfer
1

Our results on inequality levels have to be taken in the context of our sample. We think that the RLMS, like most
household surveys, may under-represent the very rich individuals who own capital assets in Russia. This is evident
from the negligible financial asset holdings of most RLMS respondents. The studies that attempt to adjust for superrich typically document much higher levels of inequality. For example, Guriev and Rachinsky (2006) find that the
income Gini coefficient for the city of Moscow is 0.625, and Aivazian and Kolenikov (2001) report a Gini
coefficient of 0.55-0.57 based on parametric estimation of the uncensored expenditure distribution. We find some
evidence that suggests divergence between the super-rich and the rest of the population in 2003-2005 (see Section 2
for further discussion).
2
The comparisons are made using the Inequality Database of the World Institute for Development Economics
Research.
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payments, high inflation, and undeveloped financial markets used less conventional mechanisms
such as food storage to smooth consumption. Food inventories were built up when income was
received to insure against irregular wage payments.
We further look at the inequality dynamics between groups in our sample. We find the
comparison of economic experience between urban and rural populations is particularly
interesting. The rural population has a more restricted choice of jobs, which limits occupational
mobility during transition. In addition, the workers with highest earnings potential might have
migrated to cities. However, we do not find evidence that income and consumption of the rural
population fell behind. The rural group did not seem to do relatively worse during the downturn,
although during the recovery the rural population exhibited a slower growth rate in consumption
of durables.
More broadly, we have found almost no evidence of convergence or divergence between
groups based on observables, such as education, location, household composition, and age. The
reduction in inequality during economic recovery resulted mostly from the moderation in the
residual volatility of income and consumption growth.
We examine the reasons for the observed fall in residual income volatility by exploiting
the panel dimensions of the data.

In particular, we decompose the income process into

permanent and transitory components and estimate their effect on consumption. We document
that the fall in residual income volatility is mostly due to a fall in the variance of transitory
income shocks.3 Over time, consumption response to both permanent and transitory income
components becomes weaker. This is consistent with better insurance against income shocks and
hence better consumption smoothing later in the mid 2000s.
Apart from the analysis of inequality trends, we examine the trends in the levels of
income and expenditure. The time trends show a 40 percent drop in real per-capita expenditure
and a 50 percent drop in real hourly wages during 1994-1998. Recent literature has argued that
the drop in Russian real output during the transition has been overstated due to exaggeration of
the Soviet output and mismeasurement of the unofficial economy in the 1990s (Schleifer and
3

Stillman (2001) finds that RLMS expenditures respond strongly to transitory shocks during 1994-1998.
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Treisman 2005) or due to overstatement of inflation by the official CPI (Gibson et al 2004). To
detect possible sources of CPI bias, we examine food prices and quantities from RLMS and find
that the composition of food consumption has not changed much. Consequently, the CPI
substitution bias within the food category is likely to be small. We do find, however, substantial
disagreement in food CPI between RLMS and National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA),
with a 25 percent discrepancy in the cumulative inflation during 1994-1998, but not much
discrepancy afterwards. In addition, there is evidence of quality bias in the official CPI.
The paper’s goal of documenting a comprehensive set of macroeconomic facts for Russia
links it to many bodies of literature in macroeconomics, labor economics, development
economics, and transition economics. In the interest of space, the literature survey below is
necessarily incomplete, and it merely catalogues some of the related recent work by topic. Our
analysis is closely related to the growing empirical literature that analyzes the joint evolution of
income and consumption distributions (Cutler and Katz 1992, Attanasio and Davis 1996,
Blundell and Preston 1998, Slesnick 2001, Krueger and Perri 2006, Heathcote et al 2007,
Blundell et al 2008, etc.). There is also a growing body of research on inequality in developing
countries. We find this literature particularly relevant for our study as it emphasizes the
importance of measurement issues, urban-rural differences, home production, and income
underreporting in understanding inequality in developing countries (e.g., Chen and Ravallion
1996, Deaton 1997).
Several papers document changes in income inequality in Russia in the 1990s. These
studies establish a number of important facts for the early transition period: rising income
inequality, significant income mobility, large regional variation, and insufficient government
transfers to offset an increase in wage inequality (Commander et al 1999; Milanovic 1999;
Flemming and Micklewright 2000).

The rise in income inequality is mainly attributed to

compositional shifts from the old state sector to the new private sector, liberalization of wage
setting, liberalization of prices and trade, and macroeconomic volatility. Some studies argue in
favor of inequality measures based on expenditures (Aivazyan and Kolennikov 1999, Jovanovic
2001). They find a significant share of the transitory component in shocks to expenditures, high
5

instability, and a slight downward trend in expenditure-based inequality. Our findings are in
general agreement with these studies. We extend previous analyses in a number of ways. We
consider a longer time span covering recent years, provide a variety of measures and
decompositions of inequality, investigate sources of inequality, and examine the co-movements
between income and consumption using the panel aspects of the data.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the data, provide
basic information on the levels of consumption, income and labor market participation, and
compare these statistics with official data. In Section 3, we document the trends in inequality in
individual labor market outcomes over 1994-2005.

In Section 4, we construct and report

consistent time series for a variety of measures of consumption and income inequality at the
household level.

Section 5 decomposes the income process into transitory and permanent

components and investigates the interaction of consumption and income inequality at the
household level. In Section 6, we examine the role of regional disparities and dispersion of
prices in generating inequality and discuss the possible sources of CPI bias. Our concluding
remarks are in Section 7.

2. Data Overview
Sample and variables
The analysis in this paper uses the RLMS, which is a panel dataset that includes detailed
information on measures of income, consumption, household demographics, and labor supply.
The RLMS is organized by the Population Center at the University of North Carolina in
cooperation with the Russian Academy of Sociology. The data are collected annually, and our
panel includes 10 waves during the period 1994-2005, with the exception of 1997 and 1999,
when the survey was not administered.4 There were approximately 8,343-10,670 individuals
who completed the adult (age 14 and over) questionnaire and 3,750-4,718 households who

4

In all plots except Figure 2, the 1997 and 1999 values are 2 point linear interpolations of the data points in adjacent
years.
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completed the household questionnaire in each round. These individuals and households reside
in 32 oblasts (regions) and 7 federal districts of the Russian Federation.5
The RLMS sample is a multi-stage probability sample of dwellings. The response rate is
relatively high: it exceeds 80% for households and about 97 percent for individuals within the
households. The sample attrition is generally low compared to similar panel surveys in other
countries, partly owing to lower mobility and infrequent changes of residences.6 To account for
the panel attrition, all statistics reported in this study are weighted using the RLMS sample
weights that adjust not only for sample design factors but also for deviations from the census
characteristics. For comparability with other countries in this volume, we restrict our estimation
sample to households in which at least one individual is 25-60 years old. Appendix 3 shows the
size and composition of the estimation sample.
The variables employed in our study are carefully constructed and made not only
internally comparable across different waves but also externally consistent with standard variable
definitions in macroeconomic literature. We provide thorough treatment of missing values,
influential observations, non-response, and other common problems of micro data. We also take
into account important Russia-specific phenomena that influence our variable definition and data
analysis such as wage payment delays in the 1990s, production of food at home, high regional
diversity in cost of living, as well as peculiarities of the transition to a market economy. The
detailed procedures of variable construction are documented in Appendix 1.
Economic conditions
Economic conditions in Russia affect our interpretation of income and consumption data
in important ways. During the 1994-2005 period, Russia continued its transformation from a
centrally planned system into a market economy. New integrated markets have emerged and
new institutions of private ownership and property rights have been established.
5

Russia had 89 regions and 7 federal districts as of December 1, 2005. The RLMS sample consists of 38 randomly
selected primary sample units (municipalities) that are representative of the whole country.
6
To deal with attrition, RLMS replenishes its sample on a regular basis by adding new dwellings, especially in the
areas of high mobility such as Moscow and other large cities. To maintain the panel, RLMS partially attempts to
collect information on those who moved out of the sample dwellings but live in the same location. More details on
sample design, attrition, and replenishment are available at http://www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/rlms.
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This transition to a market economy was accompanied by extreme macroeconomic
disturbances, both real and nominal.

Our sample period features two distinct phases: the

downturn in 1994-1998 and the post-1998 period of rapid recovery. Panel A of Figure 1 shows
that the early 1990s, following price liberalization in 1992, was a period of hyper-inflation. The
end-year inflation rate in 1994 was 214 percent.

The 1998 inflation spike (84 percent)

corresponds to the government default on sovereign debt and the abrupt devaluation of the
national currency, the ruble. In the downturn, real per-capita income and expenditures fell by
about 40 percent (see panels B-D). Employee compensation and public transfers were paid
irregularly, and were delayed by 3 to 5 months, on average. In the recovery phase, real percapita income and expenditure growth was around 9 percent annually, and inflation stayed
relatively low (10 to 20 percent).
Composition of income
The composition of household income during the sample period remained relatively
stable, although there are important differences with Western industrialized economies. Panel B
of Figure 1 compares four different measures of household after-tax monthly income during
1994-2005: (1) yL = labor income, (2) yL+ = net private transfers + yL, (3) y = capital income +
yL+, and (4) yD = public transfers + y. Labor income, yL, is by far the largest income source; it
accounts for 82 percent of household after-tax disposable income, yD, on average. In addition to
labor income, yD includes income derived from financial assets, net private transfers, and public
transfers. Income derived from financial assets is negligible; there is only a tiny difference
between y and yL+. Net private transfers are contributions in money and in kind received from
friends, relatives, and charitable organizations minus contributions given to individuals outside
the household unit. Although net private transfers should not (and do not) affect average
disposable income (the gap between yL+ and yL is negligible), gross private transfers are
significant: private transfers received amount to 9 percent of disposable income, making them a
potentially important channel of risk-sharing. Average public transfers are also large and amount

8

to 13 percent of disposable income. The share of public transfers has increased after 2001, as
evidenced by the growing gap between yD and y in panel B.
Composition of expenditures
Household consumption is constructed from numerous disaggregated categories of
expenditures. Non-durable items, c, include 50 subcategories of food at home and away from
home, alcoholic and non-alcoholic beverages, tobacco products, expenses on clothing and
footwear, gasoline and other fuel expenses, rents and utilities, and 15-20 subcategories of
services such as transportation, repair, health care services, education, entertainment, recreation,
insurance, etc. Durable consumption is based on purchases of durable items within the last 3
months. All consumption measures are converted to a monthly base. To keep the coverage of
consumption consistent across years, we exclude expenditure categories that became available
only in recent years, such as washing supplies, personal hygiene items, books, sporting
equipment, internet, and wireless phone services.7
Food is the biggest expenditure category for most households. The share of food
purchases in aggregate non-durable expenditures starts from a high of nearly 70 percent in 1994
and gradually falls to 49 percent in 2005 (see also Figure 1C). One peculiar feature of Russian
households is that many of them grow agricultural products on their subsidiary plots for own
consumption. In 1994, about 10 percent of total food consumption (by market value) was homegrown, and by 2005 the share of food grown at home fell to 5 percent (see also Figure 1C).
Despite declining in aggregate importance, home production of food significantly affects
measures of inequality, because it is concentrated among the poorer rural households (see
Section 4).
The share of durables was around 14 percent of aggregate expenditures, cD, during 19942002, but has increased significantly after 2003 (see also Figure 1D). Expenditures on durables
7

The share of excluded expenditure categories is about 3% of total consumption expenditures in 2001-2004 and 5%
in 2005. The 2 percentage point increase in 2005 is explained by adding expenditures on internet and cell phones in
the 2005 RLMS questionnaire. The omitted expenditure categories do not affect the measures of consumption
inequality.

9

tend to be concentrated at high income levels. 76 percent of households report no durable
purchases within the last 3 months.
For 2000-2005, our dataset has a self-reported market value of owner-occupied housing.
If we take the annual housing services flow to be 5 percent of its market value, the share of
owner-occupied housing will equal roughly 11 percent of total consumption, cD+. The share of
housing consumption is relatively stable over time because the aggregate market value of
housing is growing at roughly the same rate as aggregate expenditures, cD (see Figure 1D).
Income underreporting
Two data facts lead us to believe that the aggregate income obtained from RLMS is likely
to be underestimated. The first fact is the negligible share of capital income. This could be due
to income underreporting but also due to the underrepresentation of the very rich individuals in
the RLMS. To get a sense of the underestimated capital income, we can take the estimate of
personal wealth of Russian billionaires and millionaires (1.4 times national GDP) from Guriev
and Rachinsky (2006) and multiply it by a conservative rate of return on wealth (6 percent). If
this is correct, the super-rich should earn about 8.4 percent of GDP, which we miss in our data.
The second fact is that for those who are in the sample, expenditures are consistently
above reported income throughout the whole period (Figure 1D). This gap cannot be attributed
to dissaving, as most households have negligible stocks of financial assets. We believe that
income is under-reported because of tax evasion. For example, Gorodnichenko et al (2009)
studied the gap between consumption and income in the RLMS data set and found the gap to be
significantly larger in districts where respondents believed that other people do not pay their
taxes. Over time, the gap between consumption and income seems to narrow, and the narrower
gap may correspond to the effect of the 2001 tax reform, credit market development, and other
factors (see Gorodnichenko et al 2009).
Since we do not have an independent estimate of the extent of income under-reporting
(except the consumption-income gap itself), it seems to be more informative to compare
expenditure, rather than income, levels between RLMS and other data sources.
10

Comparison with national accounts
We first compare income and expenditure levels between RLMS and official National
Income and Products Accounts (NIPA). To make comparisons with national statistics, one must
be careful about using compatible data definitions. The RLMS measure of household disposable
income (yD) is after taxes and transfers given, and it excludes in-kind consumption, such as
owner-occupied housing and home-grown food. The corresponding NIPA measure is disposable
income for the “household account” after taxes and transfers minus in-kind consumption
(Goskomstat 2007a).

Similarly, the RLMS measure of consumption that we select for

comparison purposes (cD) corresponds to the NIPA measure of household final consumption
expenditures on durable and non-durable goods and services without imputed in-kind
expenditures (Goskomstat 2007a). For comparability purposes, we use the full unrestricted
sample.
Panels A and B of Figure 2 compare yD and cD (in per capita terms) with their
counterparts from NIPA. Consumer expenditures in RLMS and NIPA are close during most of
the sample period8, while reported disposable income in RLMS is up to 30 percent lower than
the official figures. The big discrepancy in income levels across the two sources is expected,
since NIPA expenditure and income data are internally consistent and adjusted for underreporting,9 and RLMS reported income is much lower than expenditures. This comparison
supports income under-reporting as a possible explanation for the consumption-income gap in
the RLMS and also points to expenditure data as potentially more informative about the level
variables.
The close agreement between RLMS and NIPA expenditure numbers in panel B contrasts
sharply with similar comparisons for the U.S. where household surveys tend to underestimate
national aggregates by more than 30 percent. The analogous comparisons for the UK produce a
8

The 1998 discrepancy can be explained by the fact that RLMS has been conducted just right after the August
financial crisis while NIPA’s numbers are averaged over the year.
9
NIPA eliminates the discrepancy between reported income and consumption by construction. Disposable income
is constructed as a sum of household aggregate expenditures and savings, and the difference between imputed
disposable income and the officially reported income is included in the income accounts as unobserved labor
compensation.
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less significant discrepancy of 5 percent (Attanasio et al 2004). Our finding is somewhat
surprising, since RLMS likely under-represents the very rich households that consume out of
capital income. However, it is possible that that the official statistics make an insufficient
adjustment for shadow economic activity, so the discrepancy between NIPA and RLMS
expenditures is not as large as one may have expected.
Starting in 2003, RLMS consumption expenditures show slower growth than NIPA
expenditures. As explained above, this difference in trends may indicate the growing gap
between the RLMS sample and the super-rich individuals. Part of the gap may also be due to an
upward trend in consumption of goods that RLMS data does not consistently track, such as
internet and cell phone services. However, new consumption categories added to RLMS over
the years account for at most 5 percent of aggregate expenditures, and their growth is not enough
to account for the difference in trends after 2003. Finally, a small portion of the gap (up to 1.6
percent of aggregate expenditures per capita) can be explained by the replacement of one of the
wealthiest oil-based regions in the North by the middle income region in Siberia in the 2003
RLMS sample (this was the only episode of regional sample replacement during the 1994-2005
period).
Comparison with the Household Budget Survey
We also compare RLMS with another official data source, the Household Budget Survey
(HBS). HBS is the core Goskomstat source for published statistics on income differentiation and
the composition of income and consumption. The HBS micro files are not publicly available. It
is worthy of note that Goskomstat does not publish the actual income levels from HBS possibly
for the reasons of massive under-reporting. Instead, it imputes money income as the sum of
household expenditures and changes in financial assets (Goskomstat 1999).
Panels C and D of Figure 2 show the trends in consumption of food (including food
grown at home) and non-food items, respectively. The statistics reported in Panels C and D are
the average monthly consumption expenditures per household member. The RLMS expenditures
are about 20 percent higher than its HBS counterpart, with the discrepancy being larger for non12

food items. Some of the discrepancy is due to RLMS survey timing: the HBS reports average
monthly consumption in a given year while RLMS reports last month consumption at the end of
year. Then RLMS numbers should be larger when there is an upward trend in consumption and
smaller when there is a downward trend. It is also plausible that consumer expenditures in HBS
are underreported if people are reluctant to reveal their actual level of well-being in an official
survey that asks, among other expenditures, the amount of taxes paid (RLMS does not ask about
taxes, nor is it linked to any government agency).
Overall, RLMS appears to be a reliable data source for examining the inequality trends in
labor market outcomes, reported income, consumption, with the common caveats of income
underreporting and underrepresentation of the super-rich.

3. Inequality in Labor Market Outcomes
Since labor income is the most prevalent income source, the inequality in labor market
outcomes is crucial for understanding the overall income inequality. This section takes a closer
look at the dynamics of inequality in individual wages and labor supply, emphasizing the key
differences between major population groups.
Aggregate labor market trends
We start with an overview of aggregate trends in wages and employment. Several studies
observed that during the downturn period in Russia, the decline in employment and hours of
work was small while the wage decline was large relative to the output decline, in contrast to
Central and Eastern European transition economies (Boeri and Terrell 2002, World Bank 2002).
We find that the post-1998 economic growth was also accompanied by significant wage
adjustments and relatively small changes in employment and working hours.
Hourly real wage level experienced dramatic movements, down 48 percent, or 10 percent
per year, during the downturn and up 87 percent, or 9 percent per year, during the recovery
(Figure 3A). Panel A of Figure 3 shows actual hourly wage, defined as the ratio of actual labor
earnings received last month from all regular jobs to actual hours worked, and compares it to
13

contractual hourly wage (available 1998-2005), which is the ratio of average monthly labor
earnings in the last 12 months to usual hours of work per month. The actual wage is higher than
contractual wage, partly because actual hours are lower.

Male wages appear to be more

responsive to output fluctuations: male wages declined faster in downturn, but they also grew
more rapidly in recovery.
In contrast to wages, hours of work do not vary considerably over time (Figure 3B).
Even in the downturn, an average employed person worked more than 40 hours per week. The
response of hours to the 1998 financial crisis was minimal. Usual hours of work are relatively
high (48 hours in all jobs for males), and they are bigger than actual hours because of temporary
absence from work due to illness, vacation, maternity leave, involuntary unpaid leave, and other
reasons. Females typically work 5-6 hours less per week than males. The share of full-time
workers does not change much in response to output fluctuations: it increases slightly over time
for both genders, with a somewhat larger overall rise for females during 1994-2005 (Figure 3C).
Employment-to-population ratio in Russia is high by international standards. However, it
declined significantly for males from 94-96 percent in 1985-1990 to 86 percent in 1994, and then
down to 79 percent in 1998 (RLMS 2000, retrospective questions). In the growth period, the
ratio did not revert to pre-crisis levels and stayed relatively constant at 83-84 percent for 25-59
age group (Figure 3D). On average, the employment rate for females is 8 percentage points
lower than that for males, which is a smaller gender gap compared to 14 percentage points in the
U.S. for the same age group (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2006). Figure 3D also shows that
the official employment rate is lower than that in RLMS in the 1990s, but the difference between
the two data sources vanishes in later years.
Earnings and wage inequality
Our sample starts in 1994, in the middle of an economic contraction in Russia that lasted
almost a decade. Available evidence suggests that earnings inequality increased in the years
preceding our sample period. This increase was associated with the transition to a market
economy (Commander et al 1999). We estimate that the Gini coefficient for earnings increased
14

from 0.28 in 1985 and 0.32 in 1990 to 0.48 in 1995 (RLMS 2000, retrospective questions).10
The 90/50 ratio climbed from 2.2 in 1990 to 3 in 1995, while the 50/10 ratio rocketed from 2 to 4
in just five years.
During our sample period, however, wage inequality ceased to grow, as can be seen in
Figure 4. This figure compares four different measures of inequality for individual earnings and
hourly wages, both actual and contractual, in 1994-2005.11 Actual earnings received last month
are much more variable than contractual earnings. Part of the reason is delayed wage payments,
which were a major phenomenon during 1994-1998.12 Wage arrears tend to exaggerate earnings
inequality. For example, some workers in the sample may have received several months of back
pay and others received no pay in the reference month, generating income dispersion that is
higher than dispersion in annual incomes. At the peak of wage arrears in late 1998, 62 percent of
Russian workers reported overdue wages averaging 4.8 monthly salaries per affected worker
(Earle and Sabirianova Peter, forthcoming).

Consequently, the difference in actual and

contractual earnings inequality was the largest in 1996-1998. Wage arrears subsided in later
years, although they did not disappear entirely: about 12 percent of all employees reported delays
in wage payments in 2005. Because of this, and also due to seasonal and irregular employment,
actual earnings still show higher inequality than contractual earnings in later years. In Figure 4,
measures of inequality for hourly wages and earnings are close because of low dispersion of
working hours.

10

This dynamics of the Gini coefficient is consistent with other studies. For example, Flemming and Micklewright
(2000) report an increase in the Gini coefficient for per capita income from 0.27 in 1989 to 0.41 in 1994 based on
the Household Budget Survey. They note, however, that inequality could have been larger in the Soviet period after
accounting for significant in-kind subsidies (e.g., free housing).
11
The observations on contractual earnings are available starting in 1998. For 1994-1996, we construct contractual
earnings from the data on actual earnings and answers to questions about accumulated overdue wage amount and
number of months of overdue pay, according to the method proposed by Earle and Sabirianova (2002). See
Appendix 1 for details.
12
Other reasons for excessive volatility of actual earnings in 1994-1998 include widespread temporary layoffs in the
form of unpaid involuntary leaves and forced in-kind payments in lieu of wages owed. The use of involuntary leave
peaked in 1996, when 15.8 percent of employees had average leave duration of about eight weeks. In-kind
substitutes for money wages peaked in 1998, with 15.4 percent of workers affected (World Bank 2002). Adding
these forced substitutes to actual earnings extends the bottom of the distribution of positive last-month income
receipts and thus increases the overall dispersion.
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According to most measures in Figure 4, inequality in wages and individual earnings has
been declining over the sample period. The Gini coefficient for contractual earnings declined
from 0.48 in 1995 to 0.41 in 2005 and the variance of logs decreased by 0.17. The decline in
earnings inequality is more pronounced in the bottom half of earnings distribution: while the
90/50 ratio hardly changed over the sample period, the 50/10 ratio fell sizably from 4 to 2.5.
It may seem unusual that inequality at the bottom of the distribution was declining during
an economic contraction. One explanation is that the timing of contraction (that started around at
least as early as 1991) differed by income groups: for example, the dramatic rise in 50-10 ratio
prior to our sample period suggests that low income workers suffered the most during the first
years of market reforms. Several factors may have contributed to the decline in earnings
inequality at the bottom of the distribution that continued after 1998: oil-driven growth that
created labor demand in low-skill industries such as mining and construction, enhanced
competition for workers (e.g., the number of employers increased dramatically), improved
compensation in the public sector, etc.; each of these factors deserve a separate study.
Although the inequality indices remained higher than their pre-transition levels, the
overall inequality decline is quite remarkable, and the reasons for it merit further research in the
future. This trend is consistent with international macroeconomic data showing a negative
contemporaneous correlation between income inequality and economic growth for less
developed countries (Barro 2000).
Many Russians may be surprised to find that inequality has declined given the emergence
of the conspicuous wealthy elite and a popular belief in the rising gap between rich and poor.
We note, however, that adding the super-rich to the RLMS data will not affect the Kuznets ratios
in Figure 4. There still might be a valid concern that upwardly mobile high earners may have
left the addresses surveyed by the RLMS interviewers, and that those who stayed are selfselected low earners. Some of the issues with panel attrition are addressed within the survey
itself by adding new dwellings to the sample and adjusting the sample weights.13 The fact that
13

To assess the importance of non-random exit from the survey on the measures of inequality, we re-weighted
observations by giving a larger weight to observations with a higher probability of exit. The adjusted weight is
calculated as L.weight × 1/(1- Pexit), where L.weight is the sample weight from the previous round and Pexit is the
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our sample is unlikely to be skewed towards poor is also supported by the RLMS aggregate
expenditure levels that are close to NIPA and exceed the HBS levels reported in Section 2.
Wage premia
The analysis of between-group wage inequality reveals several interesting results. They
are reported in Figure 5 that shows aggregate trends in wage premium associated with education,
gender, and experience. The male education (college/non-college) premium is substantial (about
50 percent on average), although it is smaller than the current education premium in the U.S.
(e.g., Autor et al 2008, Eckstein and Nagypal 2004). The education premium has been rising
since 1995 but dropped after 2002.
The gender premium in monthly earnings is large (up to 69 percent in 2000), even though
it declined to 51 percent in recent years. The gender differences in hourly wages are smaller (3547 percent) due to fewer hours of work by females. The level is comparable to the U.S. gender
premium in the 1970s (e.g., Blau and Kahn 2000).
Remarkably, the male experience premium is negative, and it is below the female
experience premium (Figure 5C). The age-earnings profile reaches its peak at age 33 for males
(44 for females), whereas male earnings growth in the U.S. continues until much later ages (e.g.,
Heckman et al 2008). This unusual earnings profile may be partly attributed to the obsolescence
of skills of Soviet-era workers.14 However, if obsolete skills were the sole driving force of the
negative experience premium, one would expect the experience premium to be low at first and to
rise gradually over time as the old-era workers move out of the labor force. In fact, the male
experience premium stays negative and roughly constant throughout the sample period. Another
explanation for this result is that dramatic economic changes during both contraction and growth
periods generated a wage premium for younger workers because they are more mobile and more

probability of exit from the survey estimated from a flexible probit regression that includes a wide range of controls
for individual characteristics. We found that adjustment for non-random exit barely changes the magnitude and the
trend slope of earnings inequality.
14
Consistent with this, Guriev and Zhuravskaya (2008) find evidence of a big shift in life satisfaction by cohort:
individuals who finished their education just before the transition report much lower life satisfaction than similar
individuals who finished their education just after. This jump in life satisfaction could, perhaps, reflect brighter
lifetime earnings prospects of workers educated under the new regime.
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adaptive. We also think that deteriorating health, particularly for males, could be a contributory
factor to the negative experience premium. The life expectancy of Russian males has dropped by
6.6 years, from 64.2 to 57.6, in just five years prior to 1994 (Brainerd and Cutler 2005). To the
extent that this signals deteriorating health of males in their 50s, the “physical decay” of human
capital could drag down the experience premium.
The residual inequality trends down over time, which is expected since the overall
inequality is declining while the various wage premia for observable characteristics stay roughly
constant (Figure 5D). By way of comparison, the residual wage inequality has an upward trend
in the U.S. (e.g., Autor 2008, Lemieux 2006).
Gender differences in labor market outcomes
Figure 6 presents gender comparisons of inequality in hourly wages and hours worked.
Wage inequality is higher among males than females, which is found in the U.S. data too (e.g.,
Eckstein and Nagypal 2004). Measures of wage inequality for both genders trend down over
time, although the decline in inequality is more pronounced for males (this is again consistent
with a higher responsiveness of male wages to output fluctuations).

Consequently, the

differences in wage inequality between genders become less noticeable by the end of the sample
period (Figure 6A). Contractual wages show less dispersion than actual wages for both genders.
Hours worked are considerably less variable than wages (note that panels A and B have
different scale). Females have slightly more variable hours, perhaps due to higher prevalence of
part-time work. Dispersion of hours falls during 1994-1996 and stays stable afterwards.
The bottom two panels of Figure 6 show the correlations between hours and wages for
males and females. These correlations are negative for both genders, which is probably due to a
downward bias induced by a measurement error in hours, known as “division bias” (Borjas
1980). There is no clear time trend in the correlation between wages and hours for either gender.
Overall, the observed group differences in labor market outcomes behave in expected
ways, with the exception of the negative male experience premium. We now turn to the analysis
of inequality across households.
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4. Inequality in Household Income and Consumption
This section analyzes the aggregate trends in income and consumption inequality at the
household level. We first examine inequality in household labor earnings and then show the
contributions to inequality from financial income, private transfers, government transfers, and
home production. We also compare income inequality to consumption inequality and discuss
possible reasons for the observed differences.
Inequality in household labor earnings
The RLMS data have several sources of information on household labor earnings. Our
preferred measure of labor earnings, yL, is aggregated from individual responses on after-tax
contractual labor earnings (see Appendix 1 for details). We note that Russian households are
rather large and often include multiple generations of adults and extended family. The average
number of adult members (14+) is 2.6, and it is not rare for a household to have more than two
earners (see Appendix 3 for the sample composition of households). In this case one needs to be
particularly careful when aggregating individual responses to the household level and should
adjust for non-response.15 However, since the RLMS response rate within the household is fairly
high (about 97%), this adjustment does not affect the mean and the variance of labor earnings
(e.g., compare yLc and yL in Figure 7A). Figure 7A shows that over time, the dispersion (varlog) in total contractual earnings across households is trending downward.
Another measure plotted in Figure 7A is the variance of the logarithm (var-log) of
household actual labor earnings received last month (yLa). These earnings are reported on
behalf of all household members by the reference person.

While contractual earnings are

monetary, actual earnings also contain non-monetary compensation (including forced in-kind
substitutes for cash payments) that may introduce additional variability to household earnings.
The dispersion in actual labor earnings has been declining after 1998, but its magnitude is
considerably higher in comparison to contractual earnings, especially in the second half of the
1990s.

As Figure 7B exhibits, the 1996-1998 period have the largest share of working

15

We impute labor earnings for non-respondents using their demographic characteristics known from the roster files
and location.
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households affected by wage arrears (67-68 percent) and forced in-kind substitutions of
payments (17-20 percent), which are the two most likely contributors to high earnings volatility
(see also footnote 9). By 2005, the difference in dispersion between actual and contractual
earnings reduces significantly, but it does not disappear entirely, possibly due to a measurement
bias of one-person reporting, irregular employment, and residual wage arrears.
The variance of the log of labor earnings can be decomposed into parts accounted for by
observable components based on the following regression:
ln( yLht ) = β 0 t + β1t DhtH + β 2 t DhtL + β 3t DhtE + f t ( aht ) + uht ,

(1)

where yLht is contractual labor earnings of household h in year t, β 0t is year-specific intercept,
DhtH is a set of dummies for household composition (e.g., categories for size, number of children,

and number of seniors), DhtL is a vector of location characteristics such as an urban dummy, a
dummy for Moscow and St. Petersburg, and 7 dummies for federal districts, DhtE denotes a set of
dummies for educational attainment of the head of household, f t ( aht ) is a quartic polynomial in
age of household head, and uht is the error term (see Appendix 1 for details on how these
components are constructed).

The equation is estimated separately for each year.

The

observables explain a significant portion of inequality; however, the residual inequality remains
large (46-62 percent, as shown in Figure 7C). The relative magnitude of residual inequality is
similar to the one in developed countries. Figure 7D plots the contributions of observable
components to the overall dispersion of household labor earnings. Location and household
composition factors contribute the most to the observed inequality; education contributes some
but age contributes close to zero. Because of its importance for inequality in Russia, we will
consider the effect of location on inequality in more detail in Section 6.
Comparisons of earnings inequality trends for individuals and households
It is informative to compare the dispersion of earnings at the individual level (ec on
Figure 4A) and the household level (yLc on Figure 7A). In general, one would expect the
distribution of household earnings to differ from the distribution of individual earnings due to the
presence of multi-generational, multi-earner households. In RLMS, 56 percent of working
20

households have more than one earner, and over 10 percent of working households have three
earners or more. The resulting distribution of household earnings is strongly correlated with the
number of earners in the household. For example, 85 percent of households in the lowest per
capita earnings quintile are single-earner, while 27 percent of households in the highest per
capita earnings quintile have three earners or more.
The dispersion of yLc is larger than the dispersion of ec throughout the whole period.
Since secondary earners have virtually the same earnings dispersion as primary earners, the
larger dispersion of household earnings implies the positive correlation in earnings levels among
household members. The trends in household and individual inequality are also different:
individual earnings inequality falls more rapidly after 2000 than household earnings inequality.
The divergence in inequality trends between individual earnings and household earnings appears
to be driven by the increased covariance between earnings of household members. At the same
time, the share of multi-earner households in the sample does not change over time. The average
income share of secondary earners in household labor income also stays stable.
Inequality in equivalized labor earnings
To account for the effect of household size on earnings inequality, we compute the
equivalized household labor earnings, yLe, using the OECD equivalence scale.16 The dispersion
for log equivalized earnings is almost the same as raw dispersion because equivalized earnings
are negatively correlated with household size (Figure 7C). Figure 8 presents several alternative
measures of inequality in household labor earnings per adult equivalent. Similar to Figure 7C,
the Gini coefficient and both Kuznets ratios for household equivalized earnings exhibit a
downward trend in the recovery period and show rapid convergence in inequality between the
actual and contractual measures of labor earnings after 1998. As explained above, the downward
trend in household earnings inequality is less pronounced than the downward trend for individual
earnings inequality.

16

The OECD equivalence scale assigns a value of 1.0 to the head of the household, a value of 0.7 to each additional
adult (17+), and a value of 0.5 to each child.
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From wages to disposable income
Using the variance of the log, we analyze how income inequality changes as we add
different components of household income. Figure 9A shows that the magnitude of dispersion
and its trend hardly change as we move from hourly to monthly contractual earnings of
household head. However, the earnings dispersion increases when we add earnings of other
household members (yL). Again, we observe that inequality in household labor earnings falls
more slowly after 2000 than inequality in individual labor earnings.
Taking household labor earnings as the base, we add income from other sources one at a
time and report the corresponding inequality trend in panels B and C of Figure 9.

For

comparability purposes, all time series in Figure 9 are calculated on a consistent sample of
working households with non-zero contractual earnings. Net private transfers further increase
the dispersion of earnings throughout the whole period (the yL+ line in panel B is above the yL
line), conceivably, because they are made irregularly.17 Income derived from financial assets is
negligible for most households, which is why financial income has virtually no effect on
inequality. Government transfers, on the other hand, play a significant role in reducing income
inequality, especially after 1998 (see yD line in panel B). The spike in income inequality in 1996
could be explained by unusually high pension arrears and unemployment benefit arrears in that
year. Having income from subsidiary farming at home (which includes both own consumption
valued at market prices and sales of home grown food) also has a large equalizing effect on
earnings distribution, as evidenced in panel C.18
The dispersion of disposable income of working families with one or more wage earners
exhibits a downward trend since 1996. However, adding non-working families (about 11% of
the sample) not only shifts the overall income inequality up but also alters the time trend (see
Figure 9D). This is because non-working families whose income consists of small private or
17

The correlation between net private transfers and household labor earnings is -0.14, suggesting that that more
affluent households are likely to support other households, while not-so-affluent families are likely to receive
support from others. However, unlike public transfers, sporadic lump-sum private contributions may cause sizeable
movements in the resources available to households, which raise our measures of income inequality. In our view,
private transfers would probably decrease inequality if they were measured on annual basis.
18
A related study by Gottschalk and Mayer (2002) shows that income adjusted for the value of home production is
more equally distributed than unadjusted income in the U.S.
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public transfers are more likely to fall into the bottom end of income distribution. Over time,
more non-working households report small positive income either because they started receiving
public transfers or because payment of transfers became more regular. This may explain why
income inequality for the pooled sample of working and non-working families does not decrease
over time.
Inequality in consumption
Figure 10 presents the dispersion of our benchmark measure of consumption, non-durable
expenditure for all households, working and non-working. We see that the dispersion of nondurable consumption increases significantly during the downturn and falls rapidly during the
economic recovery. Other consumption variables follow this trend very closely, although their
variance may have different magnitude.

In particular, adding durable expenditures (cD)

increases consumption variance while adjusting for services from owned housing reduces it
(cD+). The equalizing effect of housing on consumption distribution is predictable since many
households, especially older ones who are also poorer, inherited their housing from the Soviet
era.
Figure 10 also presents decomposition of non-durable consumption inequality based on
equation (1). Similarly to household earnings decomposition in Figure 7, the dispersion of
equivalized consumption is slightly lower than the dispersion of raw consumption. The residual
consumption inequality is large and follows the same time pattern as the raw measure of
consumption inequality (Figure 10C). As was the case with income decomposition, the largest
observable contributors to consumption inequality are household composition and location.
Education of household head explains some of the consumption inequality, but age explains
almost none (Figure 10D). By contrast, in the U.S. inequality across households typically grows
with age. The lack of correlation between measures of inequality and age in Russia is also
reflected in the flat life-cycle inequality profiles (see Appendix 4).
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Comparison of income and consumption inequality
Figure 11 compares various measures of consumption and income inequality. While
income inequality in the pooled sample of working and non-working households does not fall
over time, consumption inequality rises during the downturn and falls during the recovery. One
remarkable result is that consumption inequality actually exceeds income inequality in 19961998, which seems to be at odds with consumption smoothing. This fact may be driven by the
tendency of Russian households to store food as a means of short-term consumption smoothing.
Then expenditure would actually equal consumption plus “saving” in the form of food inventory
change.
Why was food storage likely to spike in 1996-1998? We think that irregularly paid
wages and transfers as well as volatile and unpredictable inflation made real household monthly
income highly variable (e.g., note the difference between actual and contractual earnings
inequality in Figure 7). In perfect financial markets, these income variations would be smoothed
by changing the stock of household financial assets. However, most households in our sample
do not hold significant financial assets, perhaps due to undeveloped financial markets or the low
real rate of return associated with rampant inflation (recall Figure 1A). Instead, short-term
consumption smoothing may have been done by adjusting food inventories: households that
received several months of back pay purchased large quantities of storable food (i.e., flour,
sugar, etc.) for future consumption. In this case we can have households that spend little and
consume from their food inventories as well as households that spend a lot on food, but do not
consume all of it.

Thus, the presence of food storage can make expenditure inequality

exaggerate consumption inequality. Consistent with this hypothesis, statistical decomposition of
residual expenditure variance shows that its transitory volatility peaked in 1996-1998 (see
Section 5).
In addition, income inequality may be subject to its own biases that would make it seem
low relative to consumption inequality. As previously discussed in Section 2, income is likely to
be underreported. To the extent that income underreporting varies by income level,
underreporting can introduce a bias in measures of cross-sectional income inequality.

For
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example, if higher income households report a smaller fraction of their income than the average
household, cross-sectional measures of income inequality will be biased downwards. In
particular, a downward bias in income inequality can explain why the 90/50 ratio in Figure 11B
is higher for consumption than for income throughout the entire sample period.19
Expenditure inequality versus consumption inequality
Compared to the US, expenditure inequality in Russia is puzzlingly high relative to
income inequality. For example, Heathcote et al (2008) report that in the US consumption
inequality is three times lower than income inequality.20 By contrast, expenditure and income
inequality measures in Figure 11 are roughly comparable.
Part of the explanation for the apparently high expenditure inequality in Russia is that
expenditure only partially captures the actual consumption. As noted in Section 2, many Russian
households grow food on subsidiary plots and thus consume more food than their expenditure
numbers suggest. Although the aggregate amount of food produced at home is fairly small (5-10
percent of non-durable expenditure), food production is concentrated among rural and poorer
households. This can make expenditure inequality significantly overstate the true consumption
inequality. It turns out that adjusting consumption for home-grown food produces a large
equalizing effect on consumption distribution for all four measures of inequality, as can be seen
in Figure 11, line cH. The impact of home-grown food on consumption inequality is particularly
large at the lower end of the consumption distribution (compare panel B to panel C). Section 6
additionally shows that accounting for differences in the cost of living by location (i.e. using
region-specific price deflators) reduces consumption inequality even further (see Figure 13A).
Thus, the distinction between expenditure and consumption in Russia is very important.
Expenditure can be a noisy measure of consumption when households accumulate large
inventories of goods (particularly, food) as a form of saving. Also, expenditure is not a complete
There are also reasons to believe that income underreporting declined after 2001 (see Gorodnichenko et al 2009
for evidence). If this is the case, then the attenuation of income reporting bias towards the end of our sample period
makes the true fall in income inequality even larger than that in Figures 7-9.
20
Specifically, variance of the log of equivalized non-durable consumption is 0.24; variance of the log of
equivalized household earnings is 0.75.
19
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measure of consumption for households that heavily rely on home production. Consequently,
expenditure inequality overstates consumption inequality. Although the aggregate amount of
home produced food is small, its effect on inequality measures is quite substantial.
So far, our analysis of inequality measures relied on repeated cross-sections. In the next
section, we will exploit the panel dimension of the data and investigate to what extent changes in
income inequality translate into changes in consumption inequality.

5. Time Series Decomposition and Interaction of Income and Consumption
Inequality
To understand the dynamics of inequality and the interactions between consumption and
income, we need to identify the sources of uncertainty faced by households and to assess
households’ ability to smooth consumption. As a first pass, we exploit the panel aspect of
RLMS and decompose the residual variability in consumption and income into permanent and
transitory components. Specifically, we use a statistical model
ln( sht ) = X ht β + uht( s ) ,

where sht is the variable of interest, such as income or consumption, and X ht is the same set of
controls as in equation (1). We decompose the residual term uht( s ) into the sum of a transitory
component and a permanent component that follows a random walk process:
uht( s ) = α ht + ε ht ,

(3)

α ht = α h ,t −1 + η ht ,
where ε ht ~ (0, σ ε2,t ) is the transitory component and ηht ~ (0, ση2,t ) is the innovation in the
permanent component. Note that the variances of the transitory and permanent components are
allowed to be time-varying. Using the covariance matrix for the changes in uht( s ) and an equally
weighted minimum distance estimator, we estimate the time series for σ ε2,t and σ η2,t . The
estimation procedure is described in more detail in Appendix 5.
Variance of innovations to income
The estimates of σ ε2,t and σ η2,t are reported in Figure 12, Panels A-C. Each panel uses a
separate income measure: individual labor earnings (ec) in panel A, household labor earnings
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(yL) in panel B and household disposable income (yD) in panel C. The time pattern for variances
is similar for all three income measures: the variance of innovations in the permanent
component, σ η2,t , remained relatively stable while the variance of transitory component, σ ε2,t ,
declined considerably.21 It appears that the fall in residual income inequality is primarily due to
moderation of the transitory component.
The variances σ ε2,t and σ η2,t for permanent and transitory components of income are at
least three times larger than comparable estimates for the U.S. (Heathcote et al 2008, Table 2).
We do not think that this is due to differences in residual income inequality levels u ht( y ) between
Russia and the US – the residual variance of log household earnings is 0.5 for the US and less
than 0.6 for Russia (see Figure 7). Rather, the comparison seems to point to different sources of
residual income inequality between Russia and the US. In Russia, residual inequality appears to
be driven by high income mobility, making residuals u ht( y ) large and volatile. By contrast, in the
US, the combination of high u ht( y ) and low σ η2,t points to the dispersion of unobserved household
fixed effects, α h 0 , as playing a larger role.22
Variance of innovations to consumption
We use the same statistical procedure to perform the decomposition of household
consumption. The results are reported in Figure 12D. Unlike transitory income variance, the
variance of the transitory consumption component, σ ε2,t , does not start to fall until after 1998.
The variance of transitory consumption is highest in 1996-1998. This seems to be consistent
with our food storage story, as food inventory fluctuations would cause unexplained transitory
consumption to be large.
It is remarkable that the permanent component of consumption is as volatile as the
permanent component of income (Figure 12D). This sharply contrasts with recent trends in
21

In addition to individual and household labor earnings and disposable income reported in Figure 12, we find that
other income measures such as household earnings with income from home production have a similar trend.
22
To take an extreme case, suppose that errors have no time series volatility, that is, the residual income variance
that is due to household fixed effects stays constant over time. Then, the permanent-temporary decomposition will
show zero variance for both ε and η. By contrast, if regression errors have a lot of time variation, this will lead to
high variance in η, or ε, or both. In sum, the level of residual inequality is not necessarily related to the variances in
the permanent-temporary decomposition
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consumption and income inequality in the U.S., where dramatically increased income inequality
did not translate into large increases in consumption inequality. Such divergence between the
two inequality measures in the U.S. has been explained by developments in financial markets
that allow more risk sharing and consumption smoothing (Krueger and Perri 2006) and by the
changes in the persistence of income shocks (Blundell et al 2008). Russia witnessed significant
advancements in financial markets (especially, consumer credit) towards the end of our sample
period, yet we do not observe the divergence between consumption and income variance
decompositions.23

The high variance of permanent consumption innovation is even more

puzzling given that Russian households had a variety of consumption smoothing tools such as
saving, food storage, home production, variable labor supply, and extended family. On the other
hand, the negative correlation between wages and hours and low savings are also consistent with
the lack of insurance against income shocks (Heathcote et al 2007).
Response of consumption to income innovations
To look at possible changes in consumption smoothing patterns over time, we examine
the response of consumption to innovations in the permanent and transitory components of
income. We continue to assume that the income process is given by equation (3) and re-estimate
the income equation jointly with a consumption equation that captures the impact of income
innovations on residual consumption growth. We model the sensitivity of consumption to
income components as in Blundell et al (2008):

Δuht( c ) = φη
t ht +ψ tε ht + ξ ht − ξ h ,t −1 ,

(4)

The left hand side of (4) is the growth rate of residual household consumption. The first term in
the right-hand side is the product of the permanent income innovation, ηht , and the “loading”
factor φt that measures the responsiveness of consumption to ηht . Similarly, the second term,

ψ t ε t , measures the response of consumption growth to a temporary income innovation, ε ht
2
given ψ t capturing the sensitivity of consumption to ε ht . The term ξ ht ~ (0, σ ξ ,t ) absorbs

23

Consumer credit more than doubled every year between 2002 and 2006 (Goskomstat 2006c).
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measurement errors and unobserved household heterogeneity not attributed to income growth
and other observables. See Appendix 5 for more details on the estimation procedure.
Blundell et al (2008) interpret loadings close to one24 as indicating the lack of insurance
against innovations in income. In contrast, if loadings are close to zero, then households have
enough instruments (e.g., access to credit markets, self-insurance) to insulate consumption from
income shocks. Loadings between zero and one can be interpreted as partial insurance.25
Table 1 presents the results from jointly estimating income equation (3) and consumption
equation (4). The loading on the transitory component, ψ t , is relatively small and falling over
time, consistent with households being able to smooth temporary income shocks. The loading on
the permanent income component, φt , is much larger, perhaps, indicating imperfect consumption
insurance against permanent shocks. Nevertheless, φt is falling over time, consistent with an
overall improvement in consumption insurance.
It is informative to compare the estimates in Table 1 to those reported in Blundell et al
(2008) for the 1978-1992 U.S. data with similar estimation methodology. The 2005 estimates of

φt and ψt from our Table 1 are close to those reported in Blundell et al (2008, Table 7):
φ ≈ 0.64,ψ ≈ 0.053 . Thus the sensitivity of consumption to income innovations is about the same
for Russian households in 2005 and US households in 1978-1992.

By contrast, Russian

households have a much higher variance of transitory and permanent income innovations: the
Table 1 averages are σ ε2,t = 0.204, σ η2,t = 0.088 versus σ ε2,t ≈ 0.051, σ η2,t ≈ 0.013 for the US
(Blundell et al 2008, Table 6).
The much more volatile income of Russian households makes potential welfare gains
from consumption insurance much higher in Russia. Using our estimates, we can compute the
variance of consumption growth that is due to innovations in income (Table 1, column 8),

σ cy2 ,t = φt2ση2,t + ψ t2σ ε2,t .
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Loading coefficients cannot exceed 1 because this would violate household lifetime budget constraint.
Blundell et al (2008) show that under certain restrictions the permanent income hypothesis implies φ=1 and ψ=0.
That is, consumption should change by the same percentage as the change in the permanent income (φ=1), and it
should not respond at all to transitory components (ψ=0).

25
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The above variance can be used to estimate welfare gains from consumption insurance. Lucas
(1987) shows a household with risk aversion parameter γ would be willing to sacrifice up to
1
2

γσ cy2 ,t share of their income to have a perfectly smooth consumption path. The Blundell et al

(2008) parameters yield σ cy2 ,t ≈ 0.0056 , while our Table 1, column 8 estimates of the same are 514 times larger. This means that Russian households should be willing to give up a 5-14 larger
income share than the US households to achieve perfect consumption smoothing (assuming the
same risk aversion parameter).26 Intuitively, this result obtains because variance of consumption
that is attributable to variance in income is much larger in Russia than it is in the US.
However, most of the variance in residual consumption growth is not attributable to
income. Income innovations can only explain between 14 and 22 percent of variance in nondurable consumption growth (compare Table 1, columns 9 and 10). There may be several
reasons for this. For example, consumption out of irregular unreported income and changes in
food inventories would both be categorized as unexplained consumption growth. In addition, our
chosen observables do not exhibit much time variation, but both consumption and income vary a
lot over time, perhaps due to high occupational mobility. Finally, measurement errors and
preference shocks could also contribute to unexplained consumption growth.
Overall, our findings suggest that income and consumption mobility was high in the early
years of our sample, and that the ranking of households in the income distribution has been
stabilizing in recent years. Despite recent improvements, households have had limited ability to
smooth income shocks with financial assets, savings or other insurance instruments, and the
benefit from providing access to such insurance probably remains substantial.

6. A Closer Look at Inequality Trends: the Role of Location and Prices
In the context of the Russian economy, two factors deserve special consideration as they
can help with understanding of the observed inequality trends. This section takes a closer look at
the role of geography and price dispersion.
26

This result has an important caveat: if households smooth consumption with food storage, this would induce
strong response of expenditure to transitory income shocks, but will not necessary imply non-smooth consumption.
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Location effect
Russia is a large and diverse country, both geographically and economically.

For

example, monetary income per capita in the richest Russian region is 10.6 times larger than percapita income in the poorest region in 2005 (Goskomstat 2007b). A similar maximum-tominimum ratio across states in the U.S. is only 1.8 (U.S. Census Bureau 2007).
Location is the most important explanatory variable for the dispersion of earnings and
consumption (see Figures 7 and 10). The substantial dispersion of the regional component of
inequality may be associated with the large geographic variation in the cost of living. The 2005
ratio in the cost of fixed consumer goods between the most expensive region and the least
expensive region was 2.7 (Goskomstat 2006a). With such inter-regional diversity, using a
common national CPI may overstate the extent of inequality in both income and consumption.
Indeed, using regional CPI and accounting for the regional differences in the cost of living move
the magnitude of inequality down, but this adjustment does not affect the time trend (see Figure
13A).
The regional dispersion of expenditure may also be affected by uneven distribution of
amounts of food grown at home between urban and rural households. While big city residents
purchase more than 95 percent of their food at the store, residents of small towns and villages
purchase about 80 percent at the store (less in early years) and grow the rest on their subsidiary
plots.

Consequently, rural households are likely to have a larger discrepancy between

expenditure inequality and consumption inequality. Panels B and C of Figure 13 implicitly
confirm this. The panels depict the variance of the log of non-durable expenditures for the two
groups and the pooled sample using regional deflators, with and without food grown at home.
Expenditure inequality is apparently much higher among the rural population (Panel B). By
contrast, inequality in consumption that includes food purchased and grown at home is much
more similar across urban and rural households (panel C).
While time trends in expenditure inequality for the two groups are similar, trends in
consumption inequality diverge during economic recovery. In particular, consumption inequality
among rural households shows no downward trend (panel C). This difference in trends is
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consistent with transition of rural households from subsidiary farming to professional farming,
which could have made the amount of food grown for own consumption more unequally
distributed.
Economic consequences of downturn and recovery may have differed between urban and
rural populations. One would expect rural households to fall behind during the transition due to
the lack of access to large and diverse labor markets that big cities offer and also because of
possible migration of the ablest workers to cities.
Surprisingly, our data do not point to much divergence in the mean levels of income and
consumption of the two groups until 2002.

Figure 13D shows that the relative levels of

disposable income (yD), expenditures (c, cD) and consumption (cH) stay fairly constant during
1994-2001. It is possible that rural households were already behind when our sample began –
recall the discussion in Section 2. On the other hand, the relative consumption level of urban
household was at its all-time high in 2002, 2004 and 2005, suggesting that rural households did
lag behind as the economic recovery progressed.

Particularly, the growth of durable

consumption was stronger among urban households (c and cD lines in Figure 13D diverge after
2000).
The role of food grown at home in equalizing consumption is strikingly apparent in
Figure 13D. Urban households, who spend 45 percent more than rural households, enjoy only 29
percent higher consumption, on average (compare c and cH lines).27
Comparisons of group income and consumption differences reveal important facts. On
average, urban households report roughly 71 percent more disposable income than rural
households, but their total expenditure is just 45 percent higher. Because saving rates of most
households are fairly low, this leads us to suspect that income under-reporting is more severe
among the rural households.

27

Market value of home production probably overstates its net contribution to household welfare because of the cost
of capital goods and materials and decreased leisure. Selling food is also likely to involve high transaction costs,
making net income from home production lower than its value at market prices.
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Price dispersion effect
Data on food prices available in RLMS allow us to investigate the effect of prices on the
mean and the variance of real expenditures. It is important to examine price data for two
reasons: (1) there is a concern that the growth rates of real output and expenditures may be
mismeasured due to a bias in the official CPI (Gibson et al 2004), (2) expenditure inequality can
arise as a result of either price dispersion or quantity dispersion, and only the latter captures
inequality in actual consumption.
Using the data on food prices, we find that the official CPI substantially overstates
inflation during 1994-1998. We also find that the effect of price dispersion on inequality is
relatively small: inequality measures based on expenditures and those based on quantities
purchased are close to each other.
Figure 1C shows that food expenditure fell faster than income during the 1994-1998
downturn (see Figure 1B and also the discussion in Mroz et al 2005), but never returned to its
1994 level during the economic recovery. Since food expenditures declined rapidly during the
early, high inflation, period, one may suspect that the decline is not genuine and may be driven
by a bias in the national CPI that we use to deflate food expenditures.
To check this, we construct the food CPI from RLMS prices and compare it to the NIPA
deflator for food. Let pkt denote the sample average unit price of food category k in year t, and
qkt denote the average physical quantity of food item k purchased in year t. Let pk and qk be the
sample average price and the quantity purchased in the base year. Define a fixed-basket food
CPI as
cpiFRLMS ,t = ∑ k pkt qk

∑

k

pk qk

Figure 14A depicts the year-on-year growth rates of cpiFRLMS ,t (with base year 2002) and
the NIPA CPI deflator.28 Unfortunately, the two deflators are not directly comparable, because
we could not replicate the NIPA procedure without knowing the NIPA choice of base year and
when it was changed. Predictably, two deflators in Figure 14A disagree most during the years
28

To make it comparable, we calculate the NIPA inflation rate as the average monthly inflation rate weighted by the
share of respondents interviewed in a given month.
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with high inflation: the inflation rate derived from RLMS data on food prices is lower than the
official CPI inflation in 1995 and 1998 years.

As a result, between December 1994 and

December 1998 food prices in RLMS grew by a factor of 4.5, compared to a factor of 5.6
according to NIPA. If the RLMS food deflator was used in place of the official CPI to compute
real consumption, the 1998 value of aggregate consumption (cD) in Figure 1 would have been
almost 25 percent higher.
The CPI deflator can also be subject to substitution bias if the composition of food
consumption changes. To check whether this is the case, we compare two alternative measures
of real food expenditures: nominal expenditures deflated by the fixed-basket food CPI, cFRLMS,t
cFRLMS ,t = ∑ k pkt qkt cpiFRLMS ,t

and the food quantity index, qFRLMS,t
qFRLMS ,t = ∑ k pk qkt

that weights current year quantities at base year prices. By construction, the ratio of the two
expenditure measures equals the ratio of the CPI derived from the current year basket to the CPI
derived from the base year basket. If cFRLMS,t and qFRLMS,t are substantially different, this is an
indication of a time-varying consumption basket.
Figure 14B compares cFRLMS,t and qFRLMS,t and find that they are very similar to each
other, suggesting that the food consumption basket was essentially fixed throughout the sample
period.

However, the real food consumption cF (computed with the official deflator) is

substantially higher than both cFRLMS,t and qFRLMS,t during 1994-1998, indicating inflation
overstatement by the official CPI.
Despite their apparent differences, all measures of real food expenditure show a decline
over the sample period. The share of food in aggregate expenditures also steadily declined over
the sample period (Figure 14C). From a viewpoint of static utility maximization, a change in
demand may be driven either by a change in income or a change in relative price. We do not
think that income change was driving the food demand, because real income was roughly the
same in 1994 as in 2002, but food expenditures were much lower in 2002 than in 1994. The
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ratio of NIPA food deflator to NIPA non-food goods deflator (that excludes services), a proxy
for the relative price of food, has also not changed (Figure 14D). Superficially, at least, there is
no change in the relative price of food either, so the apparent fall in the share of food
expenditures is puzzling.
We think that one explanation for this puzzle may be the lack of quality adjustment in the
NIPA non-food CPI. The Soviet-era consumer goods were notorious for their low quality. If the
relative quality of non-food goods rose over the sample period, this may have caused the qualityadjusted goods price to fall and the expenditure share to shift away from food towards non-food
goods.
To summarize, our examination of food price and quantity data and its comparison with
NIPA price indices point to evidence of quality bias. Gibson et al (2004) use RLMS food
expenditure data to indirectly infer the total CPI bias from Engel curves and estimate that 2001
real GDP level may be understated by as much as 30 percent.
It is also important to check if the observed level of inequality in food expenditures arises
from the difference in food prices that households face. Russia is a geographically diverse
country with large variations in the price level by location. Other peculiar features of the
Russian transition, including price liberalization, hyperinflation spikes, regional disintegration,
imperfect markets, and elevated uncertainty, may contribute to relatively high price dispersion
not only across locations but also within locations. As the economy stabilizes and markets
develop, we may expect a decline in the level of price dispersion. On the other hand, the Soviet
era products were fairly standardized with low quality variance. Over time, import penetration
and domestic competition have brought new products of various qualities, thus increasing price
dispersion. The resulting effect of transition on price dispersion is thus ambiguous. Figure 15A
shows the trends in dispersion of food prices, overall and within location.29 Price dispersion was
high in 1994 but stayed constant afterwards, suggesting that counter-factors of dispersion cancel
each other out.

29

Price dispersion is calculated as Var ( P ) = ∑ k Var (ln pkt ){[∑ h qkh 0 pkh 0 ] / [∑ k ∑ h qkh 0 pkh 0 ]} .
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To control for cross-sectional price dispersion, we measure the inequality in food
quantity index, qFRLMS,t, that weights the quantity of food purchased at constant, base year prices.
Figure 15B compares the variances of ln(qFRLMS,t) and ln(cF). Quantity dispersion does not have
to be lower than expenditure dispersion, because the prices paid by individual households and
the quantity of food that they purchased may be negatively correlated. In fact, Figure 15B shows
that quantity dispersion is slightly higher than expenditure dispersion in 1995 and 1996 and
slightly lower than expenditure dispersion in other years. Overall, the inequality trends for food
expenditures and food quantity are similar.
Expenditure inequality may also be affected by regional differences in the cost of living.
To control for this, we deflate food expenditures by regional CPI. The cF-reg line of Figure 15B
shows the resulting measure of expenditure inequality.

Predictably, using regional price

adjustment has an equalizing effect on consumption distribution.

Food expenditures with

regional deflators show less dispersion than the food quantity index qFRLMS,t, which indicates a
negative correlation between the region-specific food prices and the quantity purchased.

7. Conclusions
We investigate the levels and the time trends of consumption and income inequality in
Russia. The paper makes a number of contributions on issues of inequality measurement. We
explain, for example, why consumption that includes home production, avoids underreporting of
resources available to households, and is adjusted for regional variation in the cost of living
should be a preferred inequality measure for Russian economy. We find that compared to its
pre-transition level, inequality first rose and subsequently fell. The rise in inequality appeared to
have happened during the price liberalization in the early 1990s while the fall started after 2000.
The level of inequality in Russia is now very similar to that in the U.S. (e.g., Krueger and Perri
2006).
We uncover several important facts about inequality in Russia. First, poor households
appear to gain from recent economic growth. Second, changes in key observable characteristics
of households have a small contribution to the dynamics of consumption and income inequality.
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The variance of permanent and transitory income components is much larger in Russia than in
developed countries. Because of this, the fluctuations of consumption that are attributable to
income shocks are larger in Russia as well.

There are probably substantial gains from

introducing insurance schemes to smooth consumption fluctuations. Third, recent moderation in
consumption and income inequality and mobility appears to be driven by the decline in the
volatility of transitory shocks. Fourth, unlike developed economies that presumably have rich
consumption smoothing possibilities, expenditure and income inequality in Russia are not far
apart.
Our results also point out some inconsistencies between RLMS and NIPA. In particular,
comparisons of consumption levels across data sources suggest that there may be an insufficient
adjustment for shadow economic activity in the official statistics.

The growth rate of

consumption in NIPA has recently become higher than that in RLMS, a phenomenon that was
noted in other developing economies (e.g., Deaton 2005). The comparison of CPI levels reveals
that NIPA may significantly overstate inflation, and that quality bias is potentially important.
Our analysis highlights several phenomena that merit further research. For example, the
negative experience premium for males sharply contrasts with positive experience premium in
other countries. Another puzzling finding is that income shocks explain a modest part of nondurable consumption variance. This could be due to consumer durables playing a bigger role in
consumption smoothing, especially when financial markets are underdeveloped.

There is

theoretical work showing that income shocks can mostly be absorbed by durable consumption
(e.g., Leahy and Zeira, 2005 and Stacchetti and Stolyarov, 2007). The panel structure of RLMS
provides a natural data set for investigating the role of durable expenditure as a propagation
mechanism for income shocks.
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Table 1: Estimates of Consumption Response to Income Innovations.
Variance of
innovation in a
component of income

Loadings on
components

Variance of residual consumption growth rate due to
Innovations in components of
income

Year
Transitory, Permanent, Transitory Permanent

σ

2
ε ,t

σ

2
η ,t

ψt

φt

Transitory Permanent

ψ σ
2
t

2
ε ,t

φσ
2
t

2
η ,t

Total

σ

2
cy ,t

Measurement
errors and
unobserved
household
heterogeneity,

Total

σ ξ2,t

1995

0.257

0.069

0.125

0.908

0.0040

0.061

0.065

0.490

0.555

1996

0.305

0.069

0.125

0.908

0.0048

0.062

0.067

0.494

0.561

1998

0.238

0.092

0.174

0.801

0.0072

0.066

0.074

0.512

0.586

2000

0.213

0.115

0.151

0.561

0.0048

0.041

0.046

0.489

0.535

2001

0.184

0.093

0.040

0.568

0.0003

0.030

0.031

0.404

0.435

2002

0.166

0.107

0.028

0.559

0.0001

0.034

0.034

0.353

0.386

2003

0.169

0.071

0.036

0.629

0.0002

0.028

0.028

0.339

0.367

2004

0.153

0.085

0.032

0.718

0.0002

0.044

0.044

0.310

0.354

2005

0.153

0.085

0.032

0.718

0.0002

0.044

0.044

0.289

0.334

Average

0.204

0.088

0.083

0.708

0.0024

0.046

0.048

0.409

0.457
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Figure 1: Trends in Household Income and Consumption
B.Reported income per capita
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Notes: Panel A shows annual inflation rate using national end-year CPI from official sources. In
remaining panels, all measures are in constant December 2002 prices (deflated using national
monthly CPI and the date of interview). yL = household contractual labor earnings per month; yL+
= yL+ net private transfers; y = (yL+) + financial income; yD = disposable household income = y +
government transfers; cF = expenditures on food, beverages, and tobacco last week (multiplied by
30/7); c = household non-durable expenditures last month; cH = c + consumption of home-grown
food; cD = c + expenditures on durables; cD+ = cD + imputed services from housing.
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Figure 2: Comparison of RLMS with Official Statistics
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sample is unrestricted. All RLMS measures are deflated using monthly CPI and the date of
interview. All NIPA and HBS measures are deflated using annual average CPI. RLMS income and
consumption for 1997 are imputed using the lagged RLMS value multiplied by the 1997 growth
rate from NIPA.
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Figure 3: Trends in Labor Supply
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Figure 4: Basic Inequality in Individual Wages
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Figure 5: Wage Premia
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Figure 6: Inequality in Labor Supply
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Figure 7: Household Earnings Inequality and Its Decomposition
B.Proportion of working households affected
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Notes: All earnings are after-tax and deflated using national monthly CPI. yLa = actual
household labor earnings received last month; yLc = household contractual labor earnings per
month; yL = household contractual labor earnings per month adjusted for non-response. Panel C
reports the variance of log raw yL, the variance of log yL equivalized with an OECD equivalence
scale, and the variance of residuals from equation (1). Panel D reports the variance of each
observable component of equation (1).
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Figure 8: Basic Inequality in Equivalized Household Earnings
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national monthly CPI. yLa = actual household labor earnings received last month; yL = household
contractual labor earnings per month adjusted for non-response.
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Figure 9: From Wages to Disposable Income
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the household level are also equivalized using an OECD equivalence scale. HH head wc =
contractual hourly wage rate of the head of household; HH head ec = contractual labor earnings
per month of the head of household; yL = household contractual labor earnings per month adjusted
for non-response; yL+ = yL+ private transfers; y = (yL+) + financial income; yD = disposable
household income = y + government transfers; yH = yL + income from home production.
Working households include households with at least one wage earner. Var-log is the variance of
the logarithm of income.
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Figure 10: Consumption Inequality and Its Decomposition
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Notes: cF = expenditures on food, beverages, and tobacco last week (multiplied by 30/7); c =
household non-durable expenditures last month; cD = c + expenditures on durables; cD+ = cD +
imputed services from housing. All consumption variables in Panels A and B are per adult
equivalent. Panel C reports the variance of log raw c, the variance of log c equivalized with an
OECD equivalence scale, and the variance of the residuals from equation (1). Panel D reports the
variance of each observable component from equation (1).
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Figure 11: From Disposable Income to Consumption

2

.4

.6

3

.8

4

B.90/50 Ratio

1

A.Var-Log

1994

1996

1998
yD

2000

2002

c

2004

1994

1996

cH

1998

2000

yD

2002

c

cH

D.Gini

2

.3

.4

3

.5

4

.6

C.50/10 Ratio

2004

1994

1996

1998
yD

2000
c

2002

2004
cH

1994

1996

1998
yD

2000
c

2002

2004
cH

Notes: yD = disposable household income based on contractual labor earnings; c = household nondurable expenditures last month; cH = c + consumption of home-grown food. All measures are
equivalized using an OECD equivalence scale and deflated with national monthly CPI.

53

Figure 12: Permanent-Temporary Component Decompositions
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Notes: The figure reports the time series of estimated variance of permanent and transitory
components. The estimated process is uht=αht + εht, αht =αh,t-1 + ηht, where εht is the transitory
component and ηht is the permanent component. In all specifications, uht is the residual from
projecting the relevant measure of income or consumption on our baseline vector of observable
characteristics of households; ec = contractual labor earnings of the household head; yL =
household contractual labor earnings per month adjusted for non-response; yD = disposable
household income based on contractual labor earnings; c = household non-durable expenditures last
month. Values in 1998 and 2000 are adjusted for the fact that the permanent component is
accumulated over two years. For both permanent and transitory components, 1997 and 1999 values
are set equal to 1998 and 2000 values respectively.
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Figure 13: Within-Group and Between-Group Inequality
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expenditures on durables; cH = c + consumption of home-grown food. All measures are
equivalized using an OECD equivalence scale and deflated with regional CPI unless indicated
otherwise.
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mean prices for each location. Panel C reports the share of food expenditures cF in aggregate
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Figure 15: Inequality in Food Expenditures
B.Var-log food expenditures
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location. All food expenditures are per adult equivalent.
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Appendix 1: Data Description
Description of RLMS sample
This study uses ten rounds of the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS) that was conducted in 1994-1996, 1998, and 2000-2005.
RLMS was not conducted in 1997 and 1999. Time-series reported on the figures are linearly interpolated for missing annual data points.
The RLMS sample consists of the 38 randomly selected primary sample units (municipalities) that are representative of the whole country. They
are located in 32 regions (or constituent subjects of the Russian Federation) and 7 federal districts. Russia had 89 constituent subjects and 7
federal districts as of December 1, 2005.
Sample restrictions
We restrict our sample to households in which at least one individual is 25-60 years old. The head of the household in the selected sample is the
oldest working-age male or the oldest working-age female if no working-age males are present. If more than one person of the same age-gender
is qualified for the head, then the reference person (or the first person surveyed in the roster files) is chosen.
General notes
1. All income variables are after tax.
2. All income and consumption variables are constructed on a monthly basis.
3. Summary statistics are weighted with individual and household sample weights provided in the RLMS.
4. When a household purchased the item but did not report the amount of the purchase, the missing amounts are imputed by regressing the log
of expenditure on the complete interaction between year dummies and federal district dummies, controlling for the size of the household (5
categories), number of children 16 years old or younger (4 categories), number of elderly members 60+ (3 categories), and urban location.
Because of the log dependent variable, the predicted values of expenditures are adjusted as
/2
log . The subcategories
with the largest number of missing values include utilities (2.12% of the sample), gasoline and motor oil (1.63%), transportation services
(1.54%), and contributions to non-relatives (1.35%). Missing values for other subcategories are trivial.
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5. Similar regression-based imputations are performed for missing subcategories of non-labor income and income from home production.
Imputations of labor income are described in the table below. Although the share of missing values for each individual subcategory of nonlabor income and expenditures is very small, altogether missing values affect about a third of surveyed households. Our imputation
procedure is an improvement over the existing RLMS practice that treats missing values as zeros in computing aggregate income and
expenditures.
Variable description and notes
Variable Name

Definition

Notes

Individual Earnings and Labor Supply
ha

Actual hours of work
last month

= hours worked last month at primary job +
hours worked last month at secondary job +
hours spent last month on regular individual
economic activities (activities for which an
individual is paid for regularly, such as sewing a
dress, assisting with repairs, selling goods in a
market or on the street, etc.)

Unusually high hours are top coded at 480
hours per month (16 hours per day*30 days)

hc

Usual hours of work
per month

= 4 times usual hours in a typical week at
primary job + 4 times usual hours in a typical
week at secondary job + hours spent last month
on regular individual economic activities.

hc is available in 1998-2005 only. Unusually
high hours are top coded at 480 hours per
month (16 hours per day*30 days).

status

Working status

= full-time if actual hours at primary job≥120,
part-time if actual hours at primary job<120,
not working if a respondent did not work last
month at primary job, was not on a temporary
leave, and was not engaged in regular individual
economic activities

ea

Actual labor earnings
last month

= money received last month from primary job +
money received last month from secondary job +

The variable is highly volatile during the
period of wage arrears since a worker may
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ec

Contractual labor
earnings per month

money received last month from regular
individual economic activities + payments in
kind received last month from primary job +
payments in kind received last month from
secondary job

not receive any money last month or receive
back payments for several months at once.

1998-2005, all employees:
= monthly average (over the last 12 months)
after-tax labor earnings of an employee at
primary job + money received last month from
additional jobs for all employees in 1998-2005

1. ec does not include payments in kind.
2. Average monthly earnings are available
for an employee at primary job in 19982005.
3. Implausibly low earnings below ½ of the
official minimum monthly wage are
recoded into missing (0.47% of positive
earnings).
4. Implausibly high earnings are also
recorded into missing if the residuals
exceed five standard deviations from the
mean after controlling for occupational
categories, hours of work, age, age
squared, years of schooling, and
individual fixed effects (0.13% of positive
earnings).
5. For household aggregation purposes, if a
respondent worked last month at least one
hour but has missing contractual earnings,
missing values are imputed using
occupational categories, hours of work,
gender, age, age squared, years of
schooling, urban location and federal
district dummies (the share of imputed
earnings is 7.8%).

1994-1996, employees with wage arrears:
= total accumulated wage debt divided by the
number of months of overdue wages + money
received last month from additional jobs for
employees with wage arrears at primary job in
1994-1996
1994-1996, employees with no wage arrears:
= monetary portion of wa for employees with no
wage arrears
All years, self-employed:
= monetary portion of wa for self-employed (or
individuals reporting place of work other than an
organization), including those involved in
regular individual economic activities in all
years.

wa

Hourly wage rate last

= ea / ha
60

month
wc

Contractual hourly
wage rate

= ec / hc

hc is available in 1998-2005 only; wc is
calculated for non-imputed earnings
Household Income

yLa

Actual labor earnings
received last month

After-tax payments received by all household
members from all places of work in the form of
money, goods, and services in the last 30 days as
reported by the reference person of the
household.

The variable is highly volatile during the
period of wage arrears.

yLc

Contractual labor
earnings per month

The sum of ec across all individual respondents
within the household.

Such aggregation omits those adult household
members who did not respond to an
individual questionnaire; the response rate for
working age individuals within the surveyed
household is 96.5%.

yL

Contractual labor
earnings per month
adjusted for nonresponse

= yLc + imputed contractual labor earnings for
working-age non-respondents within the
household.

Labor earnings of working-age nonrespondents are imputed as predicted earnings
times the predicted probability of working
using the full set of interactions between the
four age groups (18-60) and two gender
groups and controlling for urban and federal
district dummies for each year separately.

yH

Labor earnings plus
income from home
production

= yL + 0.9h, where h is average monthly income
from home-grown food in the last year defined
as the sum of physical quantity of produced food
items (minus items given away) multiplied by
their mean price in a given region, 0.9 is the
assumed labor share of home food production.

Mean prices are obtained in two steps. First,
the household-specific market price of
individual food item is calculated by dividing
the cost of purchase by the amount purchased
in the last 7 days. Then the mean price of
individual food items is computed for each
region (oblast) and year.
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yL+

Labor earnings plus
net private transfers

= yL + private transfers received last month –
private transfers given to individuals outside the
household unit last month.

“Private transfers received” include received
alimonies and 11 subcategories of
contributions from persons outside the
household unit, including contributions from
relatives, friends, charity, international
organizations, etc. “Private transfers given”
include alimonies paid and various
contributions in money and in kind given to
individuals outside the household unit (6
categories).

y

Household income
before government
transfers

= yL + net private transfers + financial income
received last month.

Financial income includes dividends on
stocks and interest on bank accounts.

yD

Disposable household
income

= y + public transfers.

Public transfers include government pensions,
state child benefits, stipends, unemployment
benefits, and government welfare payments.

Household Consumption
cF

Market expenditures
on food, alcohol and
tobacco

Monthly expenditures on food, alcohol, and
tobacco are computed as the sum of expenditures
on individual items in the reference week
multiplied by 30/7=4.286.

qF

Food quantity index

qFt = ∑ k pk qkt , where qkt is the quantity of food

Items include 50 categories of food at home
and away from home, alcoholic and nonalcoholic beverages, and tobacco products.
See Appendix 2 for details of computation.

item k purchased in year t and pk is average price
of item k for each location (psu) in the base year
(2002).
c

Non-durable
expenditures

Sum of expenditures on non-durables in the last
30 days. Non-durable items include food,
alcohol, tobacco, clothing and footwear, gasoline
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and other fuel expenses, rents and utilities, and
15-20 subcategories of services (such as
transportation, repair, health care services,
education, entertainment, recreation, insurance,
etc.).
= c + expenditures on durables in the last 3
This is compared with purchases of goods and
months / 3. Durable items include 10
services from NIPA
subcategories such as major appliances, vehicles,
furniture, entertainment equipment, etc.

cD

Aggregate
expenditures

cH

Non-durable
expenditures plus
consumption of homegrown food

= c + consumption of home-grown food, where
the last term is calculated as average monthly
quantities of consumed home-grown food items
multiplied by their mean price in a given region.

Mean prices are determined in the same way
as in yH.

cD+

Aggregate
expenditures plus
services from housing

= cD + imputed services from housing.

Imputed services from housing are calculated
as 5% of the current housing market value
divided by 12.

Adjustments to Income and Consumption
equiv

OECD equivalence
scale

This equivalence scale assigns a value of 1.0 to
the first adult household member, a value of 0.7
to each additional adult, and a value of 0.5 to
each child 16 years old and younger.

cpit

National monthly CPI

All income and consumption variables are
If the date of interview is in the first half of
deflated in prices of 2002 using monthly national month, the previous month CPI is used. If the
CPI.
date of interview is in the second half of
month, the current month CPI is used.

deft

Regional deflator

Deflator that combines monthly national CPI,
December to December regional CPIs, and the

To adjust for monthly inflation, the flow
variables are expressed in December prices of
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regional value of fixed basket of goods and
services.

cpiFRLMS,t RLMS food CPI

cpiFRLMS ,t = ∑ k pkt qk

∑

k

each year by using a country average monthly
CPI and the date of interview. Next, the
annual (December to December) CPI for each
32 oblasts (regions) is applied to convert the
flow variables into prices of December 2002.
Finally, these real values are adjusted for
regional differences in the cost-of-living by
using the regional value of fixed basket of
goods and services.

pk qk , where pkt denote

the sample average unit price of food category k
in year t; pk and qk are the sample average price
and the quantity of food item k purchased in the
base year.
Control Variables
D

H

Household
composition

Vector of household composition variables: 4
categories for the number of children 16 years
old and younger (0, 1, 2, and 3+), 3 categories
for the number of seniors 60 years old and older
(0, 1, and 2+), and 5 categories for the number of
household members (1, 2, 3, 4, and 5+).

Demographics

A female dummy and continuous age variable a.

DE

Schooling

DL

Location variables

A set of dummies for educational attainment of
the head of household (incomplete secondary,
secondary, vocational, technical, and university)
A set of dummies for 7 federal districts, a
dummy for Moscow and St. Petersburg, and a
dummy for urban location.
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Appendix 2: Constructing Food Expenditures
This appendix describes the steps in constructing our measure of food expenditures.
1. RLMS food data contain information on the physical quantity and monetary value of last
week purchases for 50 categories of food at home and away from home, alcoholic and nonalcoholic beverages, and tobacco products. We first create wx-orig as the sum of
expenditures on these individual items multiplied by 30/7=4.286. Missing values for this
measure are treated as zero.
2. The RLMS questionnaire also asks about the total sum of food purchases in the last 30 days
(mx-orig). We discard this measure because of a potentially large measurement error, higher
probability of underreporting, and ambiguity in the question (e.g., it is likely to exclude
beverages and tobacco). We note, however, that the two measures of food expenditures have
similar variance (compare wx-orig and mx-orig in figure below).
3. When a household purchased the item but did not report the quantity of the purchase, the
missing quantities are imputed by regressing the log of expenditure on the complete
interaction between year dummies and federal district dummies, controlling for the size of
the household (5 categories), number of children 16 years old or younger (4 categories),
number of elderly members 60+ (3 categories), and urban location. Because of the log
dependent variable, the predicted values of expenditures are adjusted as
/
2
log . Missing values for food items are generally trivial.
4. We use top coding of unreasonably high prices in excess of 3 interquantile ranges above the
mean prices in a given location as well as unreasonably high amounts (quantities) of food
purchases (the top 99th percentile), conditional on the household structure and location. Top
coding and imputations does not change the mean value and only slightly reduce the variance
(see wx-topc in figure below)
5. It is very well known that inequality measures, especially those based on logarithms, are very
sensitive to very low values. For that reason, we eliminate the bottom 1% of total food
consumption (from purchases and home production) in constant 2002 prices (about 12
percent of the cost of the reference basket of 25 major food items reported by Goskomstat in
2002). While this procedure does not change the mean value of food expenditures, it
predictably reduces the variance (see line cF).
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Appendix 3: Sample Composition
Full sample
Year:

1994
1995
1996
1998
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
Region: Moscow and St. Petersburg
North West
Central
Volga
South
Urals
Siberia
Far East
Number of household members: 1
2
3
4
5+
Number of children <16: None
1
2
3+
Urban (excluding small towns)

9.34
8.89
8.82
9.00
9.42
10.64
10.97
11.09
11.07
10.75
11.28
6.89
19.09
17.72
11.73
14.17
9.41
9.71
18.39
27.74
25.34
18.06
10.47
56.99
28.26
12.23
2.53
68.91
42,541

Restricted
sample
9.61
9.09
8.94
9.01
9.24
10.35
10.74
10.92
11.17
10.92
11.17
7.33
18.17
17.42
12.13
14.60
9.45
9.73
7.58
24.28
30.83
23.49
13.82
45.63
35.02
15.99
3.36
69.55
31,969

Estimation
sample
9.66
9.07
8.75
8.91
9.23
10.42
10.81
10.96
11.21
10.99
11.31
7.37
18.26
17.39
11.93
14.59
9.41
9.73
7.18
24.16
31.07
23.72
13.87
45.25
35.32
16.09
3.34
70.01
31,409

Notes: Restricted sample includes households in which at least one individual is 25-60 years old. Estimation sample
includes households with non-missing values on disposable income. The sample composition is unweighted.
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Appendix 4: Inequality over the Life Cycle
The peculiar age-earnings profile for Russian males with its negative experience
premium (Figure 5C) underscores the importance of investigating the life-cycle pattern of
inequality. One would like to separate out the age effect on inequality from time effects and
cohort effects but these effects are collinear unless one imposes additional restrictions (see
Heathcote et al 2008). Since none of the restrictions is entirely satisfactory, we present
decompositions of age, cohort, and time effects under alternative identifying assumptions.
Suppose that the cross-sectional inequality moment M ( a , t ) depends on age, a, time, t,
and cohort effects, t − a , through a linear function. An inequality-age regression can separately
identify one of these three effects, and the combined effect of the other two. We first perform
inequality-age regressions controlling for time effects and assuming that there are no cohort
effects. This specification confounds age effects with cohort effects, and the two cannot be
separately identified. We regress the inequality moments on the set of age and time dummies:
M ( a , t ) = ∑ a β a D ( a ) + ∑ t β t D (t ) + ε a , t ,
where M (a, t ) denote the variance of log income (or consumption) within age group a at time t .
Panel A below shows the pattern of age dummies β a . In almost all cases, the age-inequality
profiles are essentially flat, with the exception of a slight decline in inequality among the oldest
workers. The flat life cycle inequality profile can be interpreted as age effects and cohort effects
roughly canceling each other out. The flat profile of age dummies is consistent with income and
consumption decompositions in Figures 7 and 10, where age was found to have almost no
explanatory power.
Panel B below reports the age coefficients β a′ from a different specification that assumes
away time effects and regresses the cross-sectional inequality moments on age and cohort
dummies:
M ( a, t ) = ∑ a β a′ D ( a ) + ∑ t − a β t′− a D (t − a ) + ε a′ ,t − a .
Now the age-inequality profiles are downward-sloping, because time effects are
confounded with age effects. In other words, if income and consumption inequality falls over
time for a fixed cohort, the regression model categorizes this as an age effect. Our results
potentially point to large time effects on inequality.
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Figure A1: Inequality over the Life Cycle
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Notes: Panel A depicts age profiles for the var-log controlling for year effects. Panel B depicts age
profiles for the var-log controlling for cohort effects. All measures are deflated with national
monthly CPI. HH head ec = contractual labor earnings per month of the head of household; yL =
household contractual labor earnings per month adjusted for non-response; yL equiv = yL
equivalized with an OECD equivalence scale; c equiv = household non-durable expenditures
equivalized with an OECD equivalence scale.
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Appendix 5: Time Series Decomposition of Income and Consumption Growth
Permanent-temporary decomposition
The procedure decomposes residual variation of income and consumption uht( s ) into
temporary and permanent components, where s denotes a measure of income or consumption.
Using the notation in the body of the paper, the residual uht( s ) from regression (1) can be
decomposed into the sum of a transitory component and a random-walk permanent component:
uht( s ) = α ht + ε ht ,

α ht = α h,t −1 + ηht ,
where ε ht ~ (0, σ ε2,t ) is the transitory component and ηht ~ (0, ση2,t ) is the innovation in the
permanent component.
Given uht( s ) , we form a vector of changes in the residual

Δuht( s ) = ηht + ε ht − ε h,t −1 (that
equals the annual growth rate of sht). The full vector of growth rates for household h and
measure sht is gh = [Δuh( s,1) Δuh( s,2) ... Δuh( s,T) ]′ , where t = 0 is the first year in the panel and T is the
last. The covariance matrix of vector g h , which has T (T − 1) / 2 unique empirical moments, is
V≡

where g =

1
H

∑

H
h =1

1
H

∑

H
h =1

( g h − g )( g h − g )′

g h is the average value of the change in the residual and H is the number of

households in the sample.
Let Λ be the vector of parameters we to be estimated (i.e., the year-specific variances of
innovations in permanent and transitory components of sht) and let V (Λ) be the corresponding
covariance matrix. Under the assumptions of our statistical model,
⎡σ η2,1 + σ ε2,1 + σ ε2,0
−σ ε2,1
0
⎢
2
2
2
2
−σ ε ,1
−σ ε2,2
σ η ,2 + σ ε ,2 + σ ε ,1
⎢
⎢
−σ ε2,2
0
σ η2,3 + σ ε2,3 + σ ε2,2
V (Λ ) = ⎢
M
O
O
⎢
⎢
0
0
0
⎢
0
0
0
⎣⎢

L
O
O
O

0
0
0
O

O σ η2,T −1 + σ ε2,T −1 + σ ε2,T − 2
−σ ε2,T −1
O
σ η2,T

⎤
⎥
⎥
⎥.
⎥
⎥
2
⎥
−σ ε ,T −1
⎥
2
2
+ σ ε ,T + σ ε ,T −1 ⎦⎥
0
0
0
M

Two identification issues are apparent from the above expression for V (Λ) . First, σ ε2,0 is
not identified separately from σ η2,1 . Second, σ ε2,T is not identified separately from ση2,T . We
follow the common practice of addressing these identification issues by imposing σ ε2,T = σ ε2,T −1
and σ ε2,1 = σ ε2,0 . After imposing these constraints, the vector of parameters to be estimated
becomes Λ = {σ ε2,1 , σ ε2,2 ,..., σ ε2,T −1 , ση2,1 , ση2,2 ,..., ση2,T } .
Vector Λ is estimated by minimizing the distance between theoretical and empirical
moments
ˆ = arg max (vech{V − V (Λ)})′(vech{V − V (Λ)}),
Λ
Λ
where the weight matrix is set to be the identity matrix.
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Estimating consumption response to income innovations
The approach to estimating the response of consumption to income components is similar
to that in Blundell et al (2008). The procedure uses (auto)covariances of income and
consumption growth rates. As before, the residual in the income equation is assumed to follow
the process
uht( y ) = α ht + ε ht ,

α ht = α h,t −1 + ηht ,
The residual consumption growth
Δuht( c ) = φη
t ht +ψ tε ht + ξ ht − ξ h ,t −1 ,
is decomposed into the parts: the influence of permanent income innovation, the influence of
temporary income innovation, and unobserved household heterogeneity. Let
g h = Δuh( c,1) , Δuh( ,y1) ,..., Δuh( c,T) , Δuh( ,yT) denote the vector of income and consumption growth rates for

[

]

household h. As before, define the empirical covariance matrix
H
V ≡ H1 ∑ h =1 ( g h − g )( g h − g )′ .
Let Λ be the vector of parameters we to be estimated (i.e., the year-specific variances of
innovations in permanent and transitory components of income and transitory components in
consumption as well as loadings φt and ψ t ) and let V (Λ) be the vector of theoretical moments
(i.e., the model equivalent of V ). Under our statistical model, with T=3 (for example) we have
⎡σ η2,1 + σ ε2,1 + σ ε2,0
⎤
φ12σ η2,1 +ψ 12σ ε2,1
−σ ε2,1
0
0
0
⎢ 2 2
⎥
2 2
2 2
2 2
2
2
2
2
−ψ 1σ ε ,1
−σ ξ ,1
0
0
⎢ φ1 ση ,1 +ψ 1 σ ε ,1 φ1 σ η ,1 +ψ 1 σ ε ,1 + σ ξ ,1 + σ ξ ,0
⎥
⎢
⎥
−σ ε2,1
−ψ 1σ ε2,1
σ η2,2 + σ ε2,2 + σ ε2,1
φ22σ η2,2 +ψ 22σ ε2,2
−σ ε2,2
0
V (Λ) = ⎢
⎥.
2
2 2
2 2
2 2
2 2
2
2
2
2
+
+
−
−
0
−
σ
φ
σ
+
ψ
σ
φ
σ
+
ψ
σ ξ ,2 σ ξ ,1
ψ 2σ ε ,2
σ ξ ,2
⎢
⎥
2 η ,2
2 ε ,2
2 η ,2
2 σ ε ,2
ξ ,1
⎢
⎥
−σ ε2,2
−ψ 2σ ε2,2
σ η2,3 + σ ε2,3 + σ ε2,2
φ32σ η2,3 +ψ 32σ ε2,3
0
0
⎢
⎥
2
2 2
2 2
2 2
2 2
2
2
−σ ξ ,2
φ3 ση ,3 +ψ 3 σ ε ,3 φ3 σ η ,3 +ψ 3 σ ε ,3 + σ ξ ,3 + σ ξ ,2 ⎥⎦
0
0
0
⎢⎣

Again, there are two identification issues. First, σ ε2,0 , σ ξ2,0 are not identified separately from ση2,1.
Second, σ ε2,T , σ ξ2,T are not identified separately from ση2,T . We impose σ ε2,T = σ ε2,T −1 , σ ε2,1 = σ ε2,0 ,

σ ξ2,T = σ ξ2,T −1 , σ ξ2,1 = σ ξ2,0 . Thus, our vector of parameters becomes
Λ = {σ ε2,1 , σ ε2,2 ,..., σ ε2,T −1 , ση2,1 , ση2,2 ,..., ση2,T , σ ξ2,1 , σ ξ2,2 ,..., σ ξ2,T −1 , φ1 , φ2 ,..., φT ,ψ 1 ,ψ 2 ,...,ψ T } .
We estimate Λ by minimizing the distance between theoretical and empirical moments
ˆ = arg max (vech{V − V (Λ)})′(vech{V − V (Λ)}),
Λ
Λ
where the weight matrix is set to be the identity matrix.

70

